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IN THE ,SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MAUDE COX PETERSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant, RESPONDENT'S
vs.
BRIEF
JOSEPH NIELSON,

No. 8605

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT,
JOSEPH NIELSON
ADDITIONAL FACTS
Defendant's Exhibit 2 is a map of U. S. Highvvay
89 at and near its intersection with the Shu1nvv.ay Road.
It is on a scale of two inches to one hundred feet. Exhibit
3 is a map of the sarr1e intersection. It is on a scale of
1/Sth inch to the foot. On Exhibits 2 and 3 are the
measured distances between material physical objects.
The measurements were made by the witness, A. Dale
Bartholomew. He made said 1naps and placed the measurements thereon. Said n1aps also show the location
of rose bushes, other natural objects, and Inarkings.
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Some of those 'vere given by other witnesses. Shown
on said maps in the middle of Highway 89 is a two
laned, hard surfaced, 18 foot wide good grade asphalt
strip.
Four white posts numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, were on
the West shoulder of Highway 89. They are shown on
defendant's Exhibit 2. Number one is at the Shumway
Intersection, number two 500 feet north thereof, number
three 950 feet north thereof, and number four 1018 feet
north thereof.
The location of a culvert, ditches, stop sign, and
gouge.s made by an automobile tire in the ditch bank
and on the shoulder, as well as location of the glass,
etc. from the wreck, are given on Exhibit 3.
A few feet west of said culvert, the road drops off
about the heighth of a n1an - 5 feet 10 inches. This
drop or lowness of the Shumway Road west of the culvert deters visibility of things coming from the north
(Tr. 174-5, 275-6). Highway 89 at or near white posts 3
and 4 rises a little or drops towards the northward more
rapidly from 1,000 feet north of the intersection of Highway 89 and the Shumway Road (Tr. 176, 197-8, 209,
273-4).
These t'vo white posts numbered 3 and 4, other objects, and the low place in the Shun1,vay Road west of
the culvert, prevents a clear vision of a car coming
towards the south fro1n Ephrailn, for son1e distance
north of .~.aid posts 3 and 4 (Tr. 272-5).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendant's Exhibit G is the publication of the Utah
Highway Patrol which gives the feet travelled per second
at various speeds, the approximate co-efficient of friction, stopping distances after depressing brake, and
stopping distances of good brakes on good pavement.
The introduction of said exhibit w.as first resisted, but
later upon renewal of offer \Vas received 'vithout objection ( Tr. 315-16).
Just before the collision, defendant drove his truck
east\vard on the Shumway Road and into IIighway 89.
When he got to said highway, he looked north as far
as the two white posts (nos. 3 and 4) approxi1n.ately 1000
feet from the Shumway Road and saw no car on the
road in that distance. He looked south and saw a car
coming from the south. It was about 600 feet away (Holbrook car). He waited for that car to pass, and then
proceeded to drive forward (Tr. 285-6).
Defendant's t:ruek entered the junction or intersection of Highway 89 and the Shumway Road first. It
entered Highway 89 from plaintiff's right. Defendant
drove it "right up to the hard surface portion of said
high,vay according to the plaintiff (Tr. 24). The court
found defendant stopped his truck approximately 6 to
10 feet west of the asphalt strip (R. 35).
He stopped when the Holbrook car was within 150
to 200 feet of defendant's truck (Tr. 10-11). He yielded
the right-of-way to said car. He then drove forward.
By the time his car moved forward fro1n bet~·een six
to thirteen feet, the plaintiff's c.ar struck it witn great
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force. Heavy black tire marks of the plaintiff's car
showed on the asphalt strip 41 to 45 feet before the
impact, and 57 to 64 feet after the impact. By said
impact, defendant's truck was knocked entirely around
and south .along the highway for a distance of 30 to 50
feet (R. 35-7, Ex. 3). Defendant's truck was completely
demoli.shed. Plaintiff's car was seriously and substantially damaged (estimate $1606.70). She was slightly
injured. Defendant sustained permanent and serious injuries (R. 35-7, Ex. 3).
The deposition of Yvonne Holbrook was introduced
by plaintiff. :Nirs. Holbrook testified the speed of her car
as it approached and passed the Shumway Inter.section was 50 to 55 miles per hour; and the court so found
(R. 35). Mrs. Holbrook testified that she observed defendant's truck coming East on the Shumway Road;
that she saw the fellow in the car lean forward .as if
to look if there were any cars; and at that time the
truck came to a stop when her car 'Yas 150 to 200 feet
South of defendant (Tr. 10-12).
Plaintiff testified that when she first saw defendant's car it was coining up the Shumway Road at what
she figured was a pretty good rate of speed for that
kind of a road; that she sa"' defendant's truck come up to
the highway and co1ne to a co1nplete stop ( Tr. 23-24).
On cross-exan1ination plaintiff testified she was
right along- or approxi1nately by the posts designated
as "3" and "4" on defendant's Exhibit 2 "Then she first
applied hl\r brakes ( approxin1ately 1000 feet North of
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defendant's truck); that then she applied her brake and
continued to slow down until she took her foot off the
brake and accelerated again at approximately post "2"
(500 feet north of defendant's truck) ( Tr. 62-3). She
accelerated without sounding her horn or seeing whether
or not defendant was looking one way or the other (R.
37).
The time at which she began said acceleration was
when defendant stopped his truck. At that tin1e, the I-Iolbrook c.ar was coming towards plaintiff and defendant
from the south at 50 to 55 miles per hour (Tr. 12, 62).
It was followed by a heavily loaded truck some 750 feet
behind (R. 36).
Plaintiff applied her brakes innnediately when defendant began to move forward (Tr. 27). The usual
reaction time \vould put her car at 75 feet to 110 feet
back of the tire skid marks, or when she observed danger
she was 120 to 155 feet from defendant's truck, although
she testified it was 50 to 75 feet (Tr. 27).
Plaintiff does not challenge the finding of the court
that the plaintiff's car passed the Holbrook car 75 to
100 feet North of defendant's truck (R. 36).
Defendant filed his motion for assess1nent of costs
in the lower court (R. 43) and argued the same.
ARGUMENT
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S POINTS I. AND II. THERE
IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE
SPEED OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CAR WAS IN EXCESS OF
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60 MIL.ES PER HOUR 75 TO 100 FEET NORTH OF THE
POINT O·F COLLISION; AND THAT SAID SPEED WAS
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF, OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE
CAUSE OF HER DAMAGES.

This case was tried by the court without a jury.
It is a law case. There is conflict in the testimony of the
plaintiff in itself as to the speed _she was traveling.
What she said about her speed in reference to the
physical objects and that which she g.ave in figures, are
two different things. The testimony of a witness taken
on deposition, and introduced by plaintiff, challenges
plaintiff'_s testimony. The testimony of witnesses Holbrook, Bartholomew, defendant, Dr. Christensen, and
Etta Johnson, established plaintiff's speed was in excess
of 60 1niles an hour; and that said speed was the proximate cause of, or contributed to her dan1ages.
The trial judge saw and heard all the witnesses
and viewed the exhibits. He 'vas personally familiar with
the junction of the road, or the intersection where the
collision occurred. In respect to the testimony of Dr.
H. Reed Christensen, he conducted and did much of the
examination, or directed its course.

A.

Findings Are To Be Upheld.

Plaintiff refers four tilnes to the case of Alrarado
vs. Tucker, et al, 2 U. 2d 16, 260 P. 2d 986. The facts of
that case are entirely different fron1 this case. T"~iee
referring to it on the question of speed, plaintiff states
the findings "" * * n1ust be based on the preponderance
of the evidenee ( app. B. pp. 7, 15).
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Appellant challenges the findings of fact herein.
On .appeal the correct rule is not that the findings must
be .supported by the preponderance as to speed, or any
other fact:
"Hence, if there is any competent evidence
in the record to support the court's findings the
judgment should not be disturbed."
Buckley v. Cox, 122 U. 151; 247 I). 2d 277.
This court also said:
"As this is a lavv action, the que.stion is not
whether the evidence would have supported the
decision in favor of the appellants, but whether
the decision made by the trial court finds support
in the evidence. If there is competent credible
evidence to support the findings made by the
trial court, then those findings should stand."
Jensen v. Gerrard et al, 85 U. 481 ; 39 P. 2d
1070.
In a case which was tried by the court, this court
said:
"Thi.s is a case at law. It therefore follows
that this appeal is upon questions of law alone.
That being true the function of this court is not
to pass upon the weight of the evidence, nor to
determine conflicts therein, but to examine it
solely for the purposes of determining whether
or not the judgment finds substantial support in
the evidence. In so examining the evidence all
rea.sonable presumptions are in favor of the trial
court's findings and judgment, and the evidence
must be considered in the light Inost favorable to
them. If the findings and judgment are substan-
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tially supported by the evidence, then the court
may not disturb them."
Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. Co. et al, 106 U.
289 at p. 294; 147 P. 2·d 875.
B.

Record To Be Viewed Favorab.ly To Respondent.

How shall the record on appeal be read or considered
by this court~ Our supreme court has said that the record
on appeal must be read in a light most favorable to the
respondent. Since the trier of the facts found in respondent's favor, the evidence should so be viewed.
Lowder vs. Halley, et al 120 U. 231; 233 P. 2d 360 ..
Our court has stated the rule thus:
"Thus we must view the evidence in its most
favorable aspect to support the verdict which
the jury has rendered and if from the evidence
the jury could reasonably find facts necessary
to sustain their verdict, it must be sustained.
This is true, even though had ~e been the triers
of the facts we 'vould have found them differently,
or even though we may not believe that the jury
did in f.act so find, or, even though we believe
that such a finding would be against the great
preponderance of the evidence."
Horsley v. Robin son, et al., 112 lr. 227; 186

P. 2d 592.
C.

Co1npetent Cred·itable Evidence Slzozrs Speed Over
60 miles per hour; and such speed U'as the p'rox·imate
cattse of plaintiff's dantages.
It is then a sin1ple mathen1atical eon1putation to
calculate the speed of plaintiff's ear 'vhich traveled 400
to 425 feet \Yhile one traYeling 50 to 55 1uiles per hour
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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traveled approximately 225 to 300 feet. It only had to
travel lj10th to 1/5th farther than did the Holbrook
car to have traveled in excess of 60 miles per hour.
Using the 1nid figure between 225 and 300 feet or 262.5
feet of travel for the llolbrook car, and 400 feet for the
plaintiff's car, plaintiff's ear traveled 128.5 feet farther
in the san1e tirne, or approxiinately half again .as fast; or
it was traveling an average of approximately 74 miles
per hour during the last 400 feet before the crash.
There is another test of the evidence \vhich reaches
the same result. The defendant testified that he looked
north and could see as far north as the two white posts
(Nos. 3 and 4, Ex. 2), \vhich vvas approximately 1000
feet; that he then looked south and sa,,~ .a car approaching
at about 600 feet; th.at he " 7aited for that one to pass and
then he proceeded to drive forward (Tr. 286). vVhen
the plaintiff testified that at approximately the two
white posts "3" and "4" she saw Mr. Nielson (his truck)
and applied her brake.s (Tr. 62), she in substance told
the court that at approximately 1000 feet she s.a\v the
defendant's truck entering the intersection. It is a reasonable deduction that was just after the defendant looked
north and then looked south and saw a car approximately
at 600 feet away. Then while the Holbrook car at 50 to
55 miles per hour traveled between 675 to 700 feet,
plaintiff's car traveled 900 to 925 feet. Again taking
the aver.age figures of 687.5 feet and 912.5 feet, the
plaintiff's car traveled 225 feet farther in the sa1ne time
during the first half of which it was slowing down and
the last half accelerating. Here we reach the result of
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approximately one-fourth faster than the Holbrook car
-62.5 to 68 miles per hour.
Is it strange that the computation of Dr. Christensen
figured the speed of plaintiff's car to be approximately
70-71 miles per hour (Tr. 250, 259). By three different
tests from the evidence approximately the same speed
of the plaintiff's car is reached.
Plaintiff had a right to rely that no car would
approach from the northward at any speed appreciably
faster or a distance appreciably farther than the car
coming from the south; and that if so approaching, plaintiff would still hav~e been four to five hundred feet north
of defendant vvhen the car from the south passed, and
when he began to move forward. At a speed of 60 miles
or less, the plaintiff would have been able to stop her
car within 251 feet at the time the danger appeared.
In that event, she would have had between 150 and 250
additional feet in which to stop, if she had been traveling
'vithin the lawful rate of speed.
This court has upheld a lovver courfs judgn1ent that
the driver of a vehicle 'Yho looked 40 rods north,vest of
the intersection (660 feet) and sa": no car "ithin that
distance was not negligent in failing to look ag.ain where
the way was clear that far; and "~here the other driver
was approaching at an excessive rate of speed.
"I-Iad Ruth Holley exercised such reasonable
and ordinary care the collision "Tould not have
occurred. Under such a state of facts Amas.a
Lowder's failure to see the truck could have in
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no way contributed to the accident."
Lowder v. Holley, et al, 120 U. 231; 233 P.
2d 350.
It was said by Justiee Wolfe in his concurring
opinion in Poulsen vs. JJ:lanness, et al 121 U. 269 at p.
275; 241 P. 2d 152:
"The plaintiff need only appraise the situation with regard to what the lawful rate of speed
is upon the intersecting road."
The same rule was again announced by Justice
Crockett in Mart in vs. Steve-ns, 121 U. 484 at p. 496;
243 P. 2d 747:
"He then looked to the east and saw no car
within the extent of his vision, 150 to 200 feet.
At that instant he was entitled to assume, absent
anything to warn him to the contrary, that any
car approaching from that direction would do
.so at a lawful rate of speed * * *."
Plaintiff claims that the testimony of Wallace Tatton
corroborated plaintiff's testimony as to speed. Defendant
denies this. Among other things said witness testified
that the plaintiff passed hin1 "approxi1nately a half of
a mile or a mile this side of Ephrai1n (south); that at
the time of the collision he would say plaintiff was
"about 8 blocks ahead of the witness." ~!anti's blocks are
429 feet without streets. Whether it was blocks or what
is was we couldn't tell from the testimony. But he
'
definitely testified that he could not tell at what speed
plaintiff's car proceeded ahead of him (Tr. 82).
Plaintiff claims it w.as the duty of the trial court
to completely disregard the evidence of the vvitness,
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Etta Johnson. Said witness went back to the scene of
the collision. She pointed out the distances on the highway and helped Mr. Jensen measure them (Tr. 206,
210). There is no doubt her testimony was to the effect
that the plaintiff's car was going a great deal faster
than the Holbrook car, and she \Vanted her testimony
to so show.
Said witness also misjudged the distance from the
witness stand to a di.stant house, which she 'vas asked
to look at through the window. Judge Larsen also misjudged the distance. He judged it to be 250 feet (Tr.
208). Both said it \vas hard to judge from the Court
Room (light in the courtroom, and venetian blinds at
the windows through which both looked, made it difficult).
Dr. H. Reed Christensen testified: That he was
graduated from the Brigham Young lTniversity with a
major in Physics in 1926; that he received his master's
degree in Physics in 1929 from the University of Chicago;
that in 1940 he received his PhD. from Ohio State College
in Philosophy and Physics; that he taught at Massachusetts Institute of Technology; that he did special
work for the U. S. Government during the war in Physics
fron11942 to 1946; that he presently 'Yas te.aching Physics
at Snow Colllege and had been teaching Physics between
28 and 30 years (Tr. 240-41, 243).
He also testified that he 'vas familiar "~ith the junction of Highway 89 with the Shu1nway Road and the
particular surface. He 1nade an experilnent as to the
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abrasive character of the road or the co-efficient of
friction on that type of road, and got the approximate
value of 80 per cent when he dragged a rubber automobile tire thereon (Tr. 254, 257). This is what Exhibit 6
shows for same type of road.
Further he testified he considered the weight of
the plaintiff's DeSoto and the 'veight of defendant's
truck, with occupants (Tr. 250).
He computed how much energy would be used up
by the co-efficient of friction at eight-tenths; and took
the distance which the plaintiff's car slid before the
impact, and after the impact, and what energy was used
by the truck as it skidded; added them, and put it into
the standard formula that gives the kinetic energy, and
he came out with 63 miles per hour which the plaintiff's
car was traveling at the point where the brake or tire
skid marks started to show. This did not include the
energy used in stopping the wheels until the skid mark~
showed ( Tr. 249).
Likewise he cornputed the energy used according
to a generally accepted standard of loss of en~rgy where
there isn't an elastic impact - such as where the cars
stay together (using the actual weights of the cars with
occupants). By that computation, the plaintiff's car would
have been traveling 85 miles per hour. But when he used
60 per cent of the energy conserved (consumed) when
the truck wa.s struck and the cars were smashed up,
he came out with a speed of plaintiff's car at 70 to 71
miles per hour (Tr. 249-50, 259).
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He testified that he saw the plaintiff's car after the
impact and before it was repaired; but he did not see
the defendant's truck.
His computations were made on the basis of 41 feet
of skid 1narks of the plaintiff's car before the impact and
56 feet .after impact (Tr. 252); and using the defendant's
witnesses figures of 45 feet before instead of 41 feet,
and 63 feet instead of 56, he judged the speed of plaintiff's car was greater than 73 miles per hour (Tr. 258).
Much of the testimony given by Dr. Christensen
was in answer to direct question.s by the court. Objections
to Dr. Christensen's testimony was primarily on the
grounds th.a t the questions did not include son1e of the
facts which the appellant claims should be included. It
has been written by some authorities that all the pertinent facts to an ultimate issue need not be included
upon questions to an expert 'vitness. (58 ..._.\_nl. J ur., Sec.
854, p. 483).
Our court has in the cases of J.llartirt Y. SteL·ens, 121
lT. 484, 243 P. 2d 7±7; and in Al/carado rs. Tucker, et al,
supra, approved the testi1nony of poliee officers as to
the speed of an auto1nobile fron1 1neasured skid 1uarks
together 'vith the use of charts sho,ving the relationship
between the speed and stopping distanees. Other states
'vhich have .similar situations ltaYe accepted the testi1nony
of an expert on speed fron1 the length of skid 1narks,
L1~nde et al v. E1Jun ick, 61 P. 2d 338 and cases cited
therPin. A situation not unlike the one at bar "~as eonsidered b)T our court:
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"Appellant's objection to the so-called expert
testimony of Dr. Castleton is not well taken. The
opinions expressed by him were largely from his
own observations .and come more nearly being
the answers of a skilled witness based upon what
he observed than that of an expert based upon
an assumed state of facts or facts in evidence
adduced from other witnesses."
Spackman v. Benefit As.sociation of Railway
Employees, 97 U. 91 at p. 96; 89 P. 2d
490.
The record shows the defendants had an engineer
(Tr. 254) and they were able to make their own computations and to confound Dr. Christensen, if they could
so do. Failing to so do on either cross examination or
rebuttal, the court was entitled to take the evidence .as
reliable, substantial and competent.
No reference was made at any time in this case,
prior to the appellant's brief, to Andrew J. White's
"Tire Dynamics, First Edition." It appears to be further
refinement by experimentation of factors affecting tire
marks on road surfaces in relation to the speed of the
vehicle which laid them down. In a number of respects,
it challenges accepted standards of this court as to the
weight of the evidence of such marks. It is also hearsay.
Since no opportunity was given the trial court or counsel
to meet the same, defendant contends it should be disregarded a.s here say; is a publication which may not properly be judicially noticed; and which is not properly
before the court.
There has been much controversy about the effect of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

Hickok vs. Ski1tner, 113 U. 1; 190 P. 2d 514. That controversy appears to arise from the fact that one who saw
a car at a distance of 400 to 500 feet \vas held to be
contributorily negligent for a collision which followed
when he proceeded through the intersection without
again looking. In this case, the appellant .apparently
contends that the plaintiff wa.s close enough to constitute an immediate hazard within the meaning of our
statute. A similar situation existed in said Hickok vs.
Skinner. There the court said:
"Plaintiff's evidence was that defendant was
400 to 500 feet back from the intersection travelling at a speed of 45 mph. If the distance was 400
feet, the defendant would have required approximately six seconds to reach the point of collision;
if 500 feet aw.ay, approximately seven and onehalf seconds. Under such facts defendant's car
could not be said to have been approaching so
closely as to constitute an inrmediate hazard."
Hickok v. Skinner, supra.
It is interesting to note that 'Yhere the defendant
\Vas making a left hand turn across a through high,vay,
and saw the plaintiff approaching in excess of 375 feet,
that the plaintiff's excessive speed 'Yas held to be a
contributing cause of the accident; and said case 'va~
disn1is.sed. Walker vs. Peterson., 3 U. 2d 5-!; 278 P. 2d
291.
We do not agree tl1at the other authorities cited by
the appellant in his brief are in point. In each and all
of them, they involve faets 1nateria.lly different fron1
tho~e involYed in tht\ in~tant case. None of then1 involYe
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facts where the plaintiff saw the defendant enter the
intersection 1,000 feet aw.ay, saw him slow down and stop
for a car which was within 150 to 200 feet, or an immediate hazard; and then uphold plaintiff's attempt to
bolt through the right of way which defendant had; and
where he had pre-empted the intersection. We submit
that is what plaintiff tried to do here; and that her speed
proximately caused, or contributed to her damages.
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S POINTS III AND IV.
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT
THE SPEED o·F THE PLAINTIFF \VAS NOT REASONABLE
OR PRUDENT UNDER THE EXISTING CONDITIONS;
THAT SHE DID NOT KEEP A PROPER LOOK-OUT; AND
WAS IN OTHER RESPECTS, NEGLIGENT, WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED, OR CO-NTRIBUTED TO HER DAMAGE.

As part of this point defendant adopts the foregoing argument.
Was the fact that after defendant had entered said
junction of the roads or intersection more than 40 feet,
and was within three to six feet of the path of the plaintiff'.s car such a fact situation that a reasonable prudent
person would again speed up in an effort to "barrel
through" as the trial court put it, or whizz by the defendant's truck at 52 to 55 miles per hour according to
plaintiff's view, and bet~een 65 to 75 miles per hour
according to defendant's view, the act of an ordinary,
reasonable prudent person~ The mere statement of the
facts to the trial court's mind, and to ours, answers itself
that no ordinary reasonable prudent person would so
do; and especially without a careful look and sounding
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her horn. He had pre-e1npted the intersection. The facts
gave her notice thereof.
On top of those facts plaintiff admitted she did
not see defendant driver looking toward the neare_st approaching car, and she did not sound her horn. She
should have known he would not be expecting her, and
that he might reasonably be expected to move forward
as he did. In view of her fast arrival at the scene, she
was wholly unexpected. Plaintiff kne\v defendant intended to enter the path she would take (Tr. 61). He
could well be expected to move for\vard on the passing
of the nearest vehicle. In view of this situation, surely
she owed the duty to slow down, have her car under
control, and to honk to ensure safe operation of the other
vehicle and her own, as provided by Section -±1-6-14
U.C.A. '53.
Persons \vho look to,vards an approaching car at
a crossing or intersection, are not bound to figure cars
are approaching at an unla\vful rate of speed; but need
only regard those only .approaching \vithin a distance
\vhich at a la,yful speed constitute an innnediate hazard.
"Auto1nobile driver, entering High,vay from
private drive\vay after looking in direction from
\vhirh another auto approaehed at greater distanee
than hi_s vision carried, had a right to presume
that driver thereof would not exreed statutory
speed liinit."
Fontanille v. Ducote, 155 S. 46 (La. 1934).
The ahoYt' ea8e held that "yhere a driver looked for
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ing, that the excessive speed of the automobile striking
the rear end of the car rnaking the left turn into the
highway was the sole proxin1ate cause of the accident.
The above reasoning and holding was later approved.
"As the defendant Taylor stopped .and looked
in each direction before beginning her L. hand
turn and seeing no car either direction, she was
not guilty of negligence and therefore did not
contribute to the collision. But the excessive speed
at which E. H. was driving his car approaching
an intersection of Church and Kentucky streets
was the proximate and immediate cause of the
collision.
Gartman v. Taylor, 164 S. 660.
Suppose the defendant had looked North again after
he saw the Holbrook car at 600 feet south of his truck.
He would then have seen the plaintiff's car some,vhere
near 1000 feet from his truck slowing down, indicating
she was going to await his forward movement after the
passing of the Holbrook car, which at the time of defendant's stopping was 150 to 200 feet from him and
plaintiff was approximately 500 feet north from him.
It might be said of her as Justice Pr.att said in
Bullock vs. Luke, et al, 98 U. 501, 98 P. 2d 350, "Any
pre.sumption that Luke was going to afford him the
right-of-way was not in the picture."
. Defendant maintains of himself as was said by
Justice Wolfe in said Bullock vs. Luke, "Another illustration would be where one enters the intersection definitely with the right-of-way, and with due c.are in relation
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to any other also exercising due care and assumes his
right-of-way to his injury, he should be allowed to recover."
DEFENDANT'S POINT I.
THE UTAH RULE IS THAT DEFENDANT HAD THE
RIGHT OF VvAY; AND ACCORDINGLY PLAINTIFF IS
NO·T ENTITLED TO RECOVER.

Plaintiff's testimony and testimony of ,\~itnesses
above named precludes plaintiff's recovery. Our statute,
±1-61±6 U.C.A. 1953, in part provides:
(a) No person shall drive a vehicle on a
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the conditions and having regard
to the actual and potential hazards then existing.
In every event speed shall be so controlled as
may be necessary to avoid colliding with any * * *
vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the
highway in compliance "\Yith legal requiren1ents
and the duty of all persons to use due care.
(c) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requiren1ents of subdivision (.a) of
this section, drive at an appropriate reduced speed
when approaching and crossing an intersection
* * * and 'vhen special hazard exists "\vith respect
to * * * other traffic * * *.
Our Supre1ue Court held the driYer entering a thru
higlnvay first had the right-of-,vay "~here he had stopped
before the other ear had entered the intersection:
"l\{otorist stopping before entering through
street, as required by ordinanee, eon1plied 'vith
all its require1nents, and "~as free to 1nove without restrirtion, relying on C. L. '17 Sec. 3978, as
a1nended by L. lT. 1923, c 47, providing that operSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ator of vehicle shall have right-of-way at intersection over one approaching from left."
Smith v. Lenzi, 74 U. 362; 279 P. 893, Syl 3.
"Instruction should have been given that, if
plaintiff's failure to yield right of way to defendant approaching fron1 right proximately contributed to accident, he could not recover.''
Smith v. Lenzi, Supra, Syl 6.
Said Utah case has been referred to in 81 A.L.R.
192, and 164 A.L.R. 22-24. Summarizing A.L.R.'s vie\v
of that case, we quote:
"The view is taken by so1ne courts, however,
if the motorist on the disfavored thoroughfare
makes a proper stop at the stop sign, he is entitled
to the right-of-way if he is on the right of the
driver occupying the protected thoroughfare, or
if he pre-empted the intersection before the latter
reached it."
It may be argued that the place of stop of the defendant was not the proper place. It has been held
"generally speaking, it is the duty of one approaching
an arterial highway to stop at a point somewhere between
the stop sign and the arterial highway where he may
effectively observe traffic approaching on the arterial
highway." 5 Am. Jur., Sec. 303, p. 669. This he did.
In the instant case the defendant Inoved to disn1iss
the complaint at the conclusions of the plaintiff's case.
The court reserved the ruling and denied it when all of
the evidence was in. We rilaintain now as then the evidence of the plaintiff was insufficient to show the negligence, if any, of the defendant was the proximate cause
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of the plaintiff's damages. It affirmatively sho,ved her
own negligence was the proximate cause of her dan1ages,
and the damages of the defendant.
DEFENDANT'S POINT II.
COSTS SI-IOULD HAVE BEEl\f A \\7"ARDED TO
THE DEFENDANT.
Under U.R.C.P. 5-± (d) (1) costs shall be awarded
to the prevailing party as of course unless the court
otherwise directs. Interpreting this rule Justice Henroid
in his dissenting opinion in H1tll vs. Good1nan, 4 U. 2d
163, 290 P. 2d 245 stated that former practice would
be followed in so far as applicable. In Checketts t·s.
Collins, 78 U. 93; 1 P. 2d 950 our cou1i held that the
co.sts went to the defendant as of course \Yhere neither
plaintiff or defendant prevailed. If such is still the rule,
defendant is entitled to his costs.

Defendant believed the evidence herein entitled hun
to recov;er_ against plaintiff. But in Yie\Y of the burden
of the appellant in a la"r case~ believed, and no\Y believes~
neither party hereto can change the findings and judgment of the lov;-er eourt. l-Ienee no assign1nent on the
ma1n case.
The rule on appeal is that the findings of the lo"\Yer
court arP to be upheld "\Yhen thert' is con1petent creditable
evidence to support san1e; and the eYidence is to be
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viewed favorably to the respondent. There is abundant
substantial creditable evidence that the plaintiff was
traveling in excess of 60 miles per hour at the time her
tires began to skid 41 to 45 feet before her car struck
the defendant's truck; and we subn1it it is a preponderance of the evidence that sustains that view.
The speed the plaintiff was traveling under the
existing conditions, with the defendant ahnost directly
in front of her; her failure to slow down, to keep her
car under control, to sound her horn of her intention to
try to pass ahead of the defendant, and her failure to
see that defendant was interested in another approaching
car, were each and all acts of negligence which v1ere
the proximate cause of her damages, and contributed
to the same.
Accordingly -vve submit that the findings of fact,
conclusions of la,v, and judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's complaint should be sustained;
and the defendant should have his costs.
Respectfully submitted,

UJeff Je Jent~en
Of Jensen & Jensen, Lawyers
P. 0. Address: Nephi, Utah
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